You raise an interesting point, but I think my critique is more along the lines of theories of qualia being nonfalsifiable. It’s an attempt to show that the “problem” of qualia is a linguistic puzzle. Any comment we make about the “existence” of qualia is not giving us any new information about the world, because it has no testable implications. To use your computer analogy, it would be trying to talk about hardware issues in a computer in a world where we could absolutely never observe the underlying mechanics of the computer. Of course, with our human brains, we can get a sense of mechanics through science – but we can’t get at the “essence” of our minds with philosophy, and qualia seems to be an issue of the “essence” of experience.

That is because functional descriptions are abstract. They are not full causal explanations. A functional description of a computer systems need not mention the need for a power
supply, or any other hardware issue, but computers need power to actually work.

If you have a full causal explanation of system S that omits property P, then you can safely
conclude that P is not necessary for an actual implementation of S. But you can’t conclude
that computers don’t need power, just because hardware details are omitted from an abstract high-level functional description.

So your argument doesn’t show that qualia are redundant. They might still be part
of the hardware implementation that implements and drives the functioning of the system.
(As they would be under qualiaphilic identity theory).

I believe that the answer is already in this essay, just read it more carefully.

e.g.:
According to Hobbes, the state of nature is defined by the absence of authority (except that of a mother over her child). All men are more or less equal. Though some may be stronger or smarter than others, each man is always susceptible to being killed by others, whether by deception, by others in unison, etc.[2] Because men are egoistic and will do whatever is in their interest, this pits mankind in a perpetual state of war of “all against all.”

He argues that peaceful cooperation is impossible without the power of an umbrella of absolute authority, for three general reasons: first, we will compete violently for subsistence or other material desires; second, we will live fearfully and challenge others in order to ensure our personal safety; and finally, we will seek reputation, by violence primarily, to ward others off from challenging us.[3] With no guarantor of security, “the wickedness of bad men also compels good men to have recourse, for their own protection, to the virtues of war, which are violence and fraud,”[4] ensuring the constant perpetuation of war.

…

The reasons Locke provides for why man might want to leave the ideal state of nature’s “perfect freedom and equality” are the “inconveniences” experienced by the majority of rational people: the costs of lack of knowledge of certain laws and an impartial adjudicator; the absence of an ultimate power for law enforcement, which allows for the strongest groups to execute what they please; and the agent’s general difficulty in judging law impartially.

My conclusion certainly is NOT that knowledge about the world – meant in the sense that we learn and consistently understand patterns in our world – is unnecessary.

My position (and Wittgenstein’s) isn’t a wild skepticism or subjectivism. It simply rejects the traditional philosophical notions of knowledge on the basis that they make our claims to knowledge vulnerable to skepticism.

When I say that we “do not need to ‘know’”, it means that we do not need to “know” like G.E. Moore is trying to prove to philosophical skeptics. In fact, I (and Wittgenstein) are arguing that our sense experiences, taken at face value, are enough to prove that we are certain in our knowledge. We don’t need fancy philosophical arguments to prove that “here is a hand”; statements like “here is a hand” form the foundation of how we think, so to challenge their truth isn’t just mistaken, it’s also pointless.