Philpropsophy – Philosophy Articles and Article Summaries

Thomas Hobbes and John Locke were relative contemporaries in philosophy, so it is no surprise that their comparison has become something of a cliché (hence this?). While both philosophers use language couched in the tradition of natural law, they both advocate radically different views on human nature and ideal governance, as will be seen. Since Locke and Hobbes get name-dropped by pseudointellectuals regularly, it’s probably a good idea to get a feel for the basics.

Hobbes

Firstly, Hobbes’s moral philosophy is specifically egoistic. While many of his statements point to his being a psychological egoist, much of what he says implies that he is, in fact, an ethical egoist: he believes that we ought to do what is in our individual self-interest. Namely, he suggests that humans are frequently short-sighted in their decisions, self-deceptive about their motives (e.g. altruism), and otherwise unreliable in rationally determining actions in their interests. Generally speaking, while we always act in our self-interest, we do not always act in a way that fulfills it best (though we ought to).[1]

According to Hobbes, the state of nature is defined by the absence of authority (except that of a mother over her child). All men are more or less equal. Though some may be stronger or smarter than others, each man is always susceptible to being killed by others, whether by deception, by others in unison, etc.[2] Because men are egoistic and will do whatever is in their interest, this pits mankind in a perpetual state of war of “all against all.”

He argues that peaceful cooperation is impossible without the power of an umbrella of absolute authority, for three general reasons: first, we will compete violently for subsistence or other material desires; second, we will live fearfully and challenge others in order to ensure our personal safety; and finally, we will seek reputation, by violence primarily, to ward others off from challenging us.[3] With no guarantor of security, “the wickedness of bad men also compels good men to have recourse, for their own protection, to the virtues of war, which are violence and fraud,”[4] ensuring the constant perpetuation of war.

In the state of nature, man has “a right to all things,” which is an implicit basis for the rest of Hobbes’s argument for the moral rightness of an absolute sovereign. He derives this right from the understanding that all humans seek self-preservation and are not only entitled to it, but to be the judges of what it entails. Given that, Hobbes states, “…this also is consequent: that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have no place [in the state of nature].”[5]

The Sovereign

From these suppositions and observations about human nature, Hobbes invariably concludes the requirement of an absolute sovereign. In accordance with egoism, we ought to avoid the state of nature because doing so is prudently avoiding violent death. In turn, the only thing that can allow humans to avoid the state of nature is an unlimited sovereign. Hobbes’s first “law of nature” states, “every man ought to endeavor peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it, and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war.”[6] Hobbes’s second law states:

“That a man be willing, when others are so too, as far-forth as for peace and defense of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things, and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself.” [7]

These two laws are the bridges Hobbes builds to close the gap between the state of nature and civil society. Because man should endeavor peace, and because the antithesis of peace is man exercising his right to all things (i.e. war in the state of nature), man must sacrifice this right for others to do the same. This specifically includes the right of judgment, which is then transferred to the sovereign. The result is a government with absolute power, as the only rightful judge of any dispute. If the government’s power is not absolute, then a state of war persists because the government does not possess all the means to stop it.

Some Problems with Hobbes’ Sovereign

Hobbes’s explanation for the formation of civil society is troublesome, at best. The covenant (or contract) that Hobbes suggests for the empowerment of an absolute unlimited has numerous difficulties in being both plausible and consistent. When the sovereign fails to protect life, the duty of obedience lapses, but that leaves unanswered the question of what one’s obligations are during civil war. Hobbes tries to remedy this problem by placing emphasis on promise-keeping as having moral value, yet a civil war (the breakdown of government’s control) represents a lapse into the state of nature, in which there are no obligations, and a paradox in Hobbes’ thought arises. The only consistent solution is for the people to obey whoever possesses the supreme force. Also, the covenant meets difficulties when applied to those born into existing governments, to which Hobbes objects that those who did not explicitly consent to the covenant are at least responsible for it implicitly, because it is in their self-interest to do so. However, this is really an objection of prudence and can be disputed by any amount of evidence to the contrary. Overall, the contract produced by Hobbes is hardly genuine.

Furthermore, Hobbes’s account of human nature and rights leaves much to be desired. From positing a hypothetical state of nature, he semi-sensibly concludes that in such a state, each individual has a “right to all things.” However, he incorrectly uses this single hypothetical state as the moral barometer with which he judges everything else. In other words, he fails to acknowledge any human-based moral truths that are broader than the “right to all” found in his hypothetical state of nature. Internally, this may pose no problem for the traditional mechanistic, psychological egoist Hobbes: there is no use for morality if the world is determined, and rights are determined by what one can and can not do; liberty, as he says, is freedom of motion. Thus, the right of man would be to assure his freedom of motion by any means possible, which (when unregulated) results in the destructive state of nature, and so forth.

However, for a reading of Hobbes that allows for moral error, it is precisely because the state of nature is so chaotic, dangerous, and unpredictable that humans cannot be expected to choose the “high road” while their primary concern, their own preservation, is in direct danger. The upshot is that the “high road”[8] exists, and there is no reason why it can not be taken under different circumstances. Though he provides a very compelling scientific-deductive argument for the state of nature as it results from human inclinations (to be selfish, aggressive, vainglorious, etc.), Hobbes too rapidly concludes that egoistic behavior always results in a dangerous state of nature. Egoists behaving rationally can recognize that, for example, the breaking of a contract may be a plausible enterprise now, but it results in the inability to construct contracts later because of a reputation effect. They can recognize that force is not a value- it can only be used to confiscate values which can only be made by production (a rational process) – and that a world of force is a hungry and poor one, with little incentive to change. They may, as in Locke, recognize rationally that committing an act of force to rule another essentially subjects them to a forfeiture of their own rights. Many present and past societies such as those in the United States have shown that the combination of minimal government and egoistic individuals, forming what would be according to Hobbes a state of nature, have coexisted peacefully and produced much “commodious living.” Therefore, the greatest good for the egoist individual does not invariably reside in consent to absolute governance, as Hobbes would insist.

Locke

On the other hand, Locke expresses a different notion of human nature and, concordantly, of the state of nature. He holds that “Men living according to reason, without a common superior on earth, to judge between them, is properly the state of nature.”[9] Because Locke’s theory is rooted in natural law, his arguments closely follow the notion of the objective rights of individuals- broadly, their freedom, equality, and independence. His portrayal of the state of nature better resembles one of anarchic individualism, an image far from the brutality and paranoia of the Hobbesian state. Locke claims, indirectly, that Hobbes fails to distinguish appropriately between the state of nature and the state of war. He also does not simply posit man in nature as a thought experiment, as does Hobbes, but he suggests that historically many have lived in such a state.

Locke asserts the transcendent reality of natural law, with reason as the tool for discovering it. In short, by initiating force, aggressors against persons or property have renounced reason (and their humanity) and are subject to force themselves.[10] Underlying Locke’s nature-war distinction, only the initiation of force constitutes a state of war, and thus a state of nature can exist in peace. While Hobbes described man in nature as primarily amoral, Locke holds the opposite as true. Besides the existentialist-like quality of morality under natural law- by which one who wills some immoral wrong has inevitably willed it universally and for himself- rationality also guides action by demonstrating the counter-productivity and destructiveness of aggression against one’s fellow man. In this way, Locke addresses the problems in Hobbes’s analysis of the violent and chaotic implications of egoism, instead arguing for the spontaneous orders caused by rational self-interested thought.

Locke’s Civil Society

The reasons Locke provides for why man might want to leave the ideal state of nature’s “perfect freedom and equality” are the “inconveniences” experienced by the majority of rational people: the costs of lack of knowledge of certain laws and an impartial adjudicator; the absence of an ultimate power for law enforcement, which allows for the strongest groups to execute what they please; and the agent’s general difficulty in judging law impartially.

For Locke, the purpose of civil society is not for the governed to be directly guided in such a way that they will survive and flourish, as Hobbes might advocate. Though survival and propagation are the preferred outcomes, the function of government is specifically to provide a framework for the protection of life, liberty, and property. Locke’s view can be summarized as one of a minimal state, whose justification requires total consent of the governed.[11] His objections to unlimited sovereignty of the kind Hobbes supports are part of an implicit undercurrent of his works, but are well-delineated in his Second Treatise in Chapter IV, “Of Slavery”:

“But freedom of men under government, is, to have a standing rule to live by, common to every one of that society, and made by the legislative power erected in it; a liberty to follow my own will in all things, where the rule prescribes not; and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown arbitrary will of another man: as freedom of nature is, to be under no other restraint but the law of nature.”

Unlimited sovereign authority is precisely that: the inconstant, uncertain, unknown arbitrary will of another man. The only form of government which is consistent with the rights of man is one which is restrained by the law of nature.

Some Problems in Locke

By contrast, we can see the comparative improvements of Locke’s political theory over that of Hobbes, though it also possesses some significant shortcomings. Among these are issues of consent to governance, in which Locke suffers from the same plausibility-versus-consistency trade-off as Hobbes does; and the inherent conflict between the idea of electing an arbitrator and government as the imposition of a single one for all.[12]

Consent is largely a problem for any political theory which treasures the independence of man, in the sense that there are numerous externalities that complicate the pragmatic feasibility of a right to secede and form governments freely. Locke somewhat resolves this with his doctrine of tacit consent, appearing the moment that someone resides in a sovereign’s territory or owns property there. However, this is at best a patchwork fix to the problem of consent, since governance should be a compact between the state and the governed, none of which directly implies territoriality or any non-consensual obligation.

Likewise, the need for a universal arbitrator as a reason for exiting the state of nature to form civil society can be contested. One might ask, “Who is to arbitrate between the people and the state?” This creates another problem for Locke, who acknowledges it:

“Where an appeal to the Law … lies open, but the remedy is deny’d by a manifest perverting of Justice, … there it is hard to imagine any thing but a State of War. For wherever violence is used, and injury done, though by hands appointed to administer Justice, it is still violence and injury, however colour’d with the Name, Pretences, or Forms of Law…”[13]

Concerns about the capture of arbitration, especially one which is practically monopolized on issues of force, severely undermine Locke’s political theory in favor of anarchistic individualism. Likely sensing that this objection was beyond the scope of his capabilities and not inclined to accept rebellion as a solution, Locke simply suggests that those dissatisfied with arbitration, with no other appeal available, “are left to the only remedy in such cases, an appeal to heaven.”

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[1] The remainder of this paper will attempt to focus on Hobbes through the lens of this interpretation, but elements of his work better served by a more mechanistic interpretation may crop up. The primary purpose of emphasizing a more “moral” Hobbes is to make him more compatible in comparison to Locke, and to make the discussion of proper governance more meaningful.

[2] Hobbes, Leviathan, xiii.

[3] Hobbes, Leviathan, xiii.

[4] Hobbes, De Cive, Epistle Dedicatory.

[5] Hobbes, Leviathan, xiii.

[6] Hobbes, Leviathan, xiv.

[7] Hobbes, Leviathan, xiv.

[8] The “high road” is used in the ethical egoist’s sense, i.e. the most rational action of self-interest. This could entail even a Lockean perception of morality, connecting the two thinkers quite closely.

[9] Locke, Two Treatises. 2.19

[10] Locke, Two Treatises. 2.16

[11] Locke, Two Treatises. 2.176

[12] Locke’s Political Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke-political/. Accessed March 05, 2007.

[13] Locke, Two Treatises. 2.20